Civil Rights: Of Prisons and the English Canon

PERHAPS the most distinctive feature of an English Literature education at present is its considerable dependence on canonical texts which have traditionally become accepted as being exceptionally meritable in a unspoken (But still, somehow, perceptible) variety of aspects – stylistic expression, command of the language, and the conveyance of moral ideals deemed beneficial to society. Clearly, it is therefore reasonable to assume that the entire existence of a canon is contingent upon the idea of exclusivity, that the premium placed on a particular selection of literary works is done so with great specificity and deliberation. Beginning with that fundamental supposition, it naturally follows that the canon aligns itself with an essentialist view of literature. This is the belief that there are definitive characteristics to what a literary piece should – or should not – be, and what separates “text” from mere “words” (Undoubtedly, there are overwhelmingly numerous discussions that attempt to identify these characteristics, though they, at least for now, contribute little to the central argument here). And, after all, who decides what’s worthy of the canon?

The resultant effect of adopting a canonical approach to appreciating and teaching literature is a stifling of civil rights movements that develop their causes through literary avenues. If we accept that minority (This term is not limited to numerically inferior groups, but can easily accomodate collectives which lack representation as well) individuals have a complete capacity to build an identity for themselves by means of literature, then by extension, there is a crippling necessity for a common language and more importantly, a common understanding of that medium – only then can its providence be recognized. More often than not, however, this common understanding is monopolized by the antithetical socially dominant, who (Surprise, surprise) strengthen their establishment through a monodimensional literary canon that is “ethnocentric… and antagonistic to diversity or of embodying absolute judgments which cannot be sustained,” (Fleming, 1999). This does not suggest that minority voices are absent, but rather suppressed and inundated by the prevalence of what French feminist Julia Kristeva (1980) designates the “symbolic” realm of the English language: structured, organized, and repressive.

OF greater consequence beyond mere inhibition, however, is the corruption of minority literature when writers are forced to adopt the very language of oppression and adhere by canonical guidelines simply to gain some semblance of social acceptance. It is important that the construction of an identity unique to the minority member alone is untainted by inaccuracy of unrepresentative aggregations. Using literature to fulfill this hence demands some degree of sufficient communicative gradation, which authors can adapt to, independently decide, regulate and define the parameters of a personal narrative they feel most relevant, and not merely an arbitrary imposition by the canon. Under no circumstances can the complexities of an entire civil rights movement be cumulated as a broad and imprecise summation to fulfill “an appealing sort of vagueness,” (Tarn, 1993). This respect for social diversity is contrary to the whole notion of a literary canon. Literature “can be envisioned that it is not at all universalist, or reflecting the hegemonic temptations of the new world order,” Instead, it “seeks to present a patchwork of minor literatures” to assemble a consciousness that preserves the multiplicity of perspectives (Touaf & Boutkhil, 2006). The following excerpt from An Introduction to Post-colonial Theory is particularly apt:

…[Literature], we have stressed, is not a homogenous category… Rather, it refers to a typical configuration that is always in the process of change, never consistent with itself. (An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory, p. 19)

NOT just possessive of a systemic inability to represent the politically poor, the canon is quite obviously tremendously exclusionary – even to individuals of common belief; it is perturbing that canonical behavior has an unsettling penchant for enforcing homogeneity, without provisions for moderation. This is likely to be perceived as an authoritative barometer for the universal standards of the civil rights movement in question, since the canon is a gateway to what the masses consider “correct” or “the pinnacle”. Hence, a large segment of minority members in society who may perhaps believe in varying levels of their respective civil rights movements are disenfranchised by this restrictive absolutism. In Black Women, Writing and Identity, writer Carole Boyce Davies (1994) considers the reluctance of black female writers to be labeled as being part of the wider scheme of post-colonialism for fear of reprisal from a society that had yet to fully shed its discriminatory structures against the entire notion of African-American emancipation, because, in this circumstance, the canon shuts off resistance efforts as “not normal” and “questionable”.

THE canon eliminates “whole territories of historical consciousness silenced by the power establishment and invaded by the dominant to make them inaccessible to other voices,” (Attridge & Rosemary, 1998) This is possibly evident by the extent of perennialism in preferred systems of education – such is the didactic and essentialist function of that which is canonical.

Sources

Attridge, D., & Rosemary, J. (1998). Writing south africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://books.google.com.sg/books?hl=en&lr=&id=n0tH6KLudrAC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=role of political literatureapartheid&ots=PaVpMlagSz&sig=NSI7LuF1C1fB9rVOd14cz2OXT2M

Corse, S. M. (1994). Nationalism and literature. (p. 77). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://books.google.com.sg/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YH0Ru6Al66sC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=literature and politics and the individual&ots=RqEeJkcgag&sig=WlvHTBHpfUO4lTVjCgCCw-I98iI

Fleming, M. (1999). The literary canon: The implications for teaching language as a subject. (p. 1). Durham: University of Durham Press.

Kristeva, J. (1980). Desire in language: A semiotic approach to literature and art. New York: Columbia University Press.

Tarn, T. H. (1993). The lady of soul and her ultimate “s” machine. Singapore:

Touaf, L., & Boutkhil, S. (2006). Representing minorities: Studies in literature and criticism. (p. ix). Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press. Retrieved from http://www.c-s-p.org/flyers/9781847180469-sample.pdf

Mr. and Mrs. Marx: Feminism, Structural Imposition, and Ads

IMAGINE this: A truck barrels down the highway at high speed, narrowly avoiding several other vehicles. Oddly enough – beyond perhaps, well, irresponsible commuter’s behavior and risky driving – of far greater concern, however, is the sarcophagus of a strikingly bright-colored corporate livery which adorns the transport. It’s an image that individuals unacquainted to (for lack of better expression) liberal frameworks of perceiving society are likely to miss – more so in as conservative a community as this.

The advertisement features something most of us would unquestioningly consider ubiquitous: a middle-aged woman, blonde, operating a cooking pan purportedly of the latest technological advances: non-stick, minimal grease residue, easy-cleaning – really just the usual value-adds corporations love publicising.

And that’s what makes it all the more of a tremendous issue. The instantaneous average human response is a self-completing image that cements unknowns and knowledge gaps, independent of whether any relevant information is present or not, of the persona featured in the product pitch. Sure, here’s what we see: an ordinary person working a kitchen object, presumably preparing a meal. But what do we actually mean? The translation of this simple idea by our subconscious faculties is certainly more complex (and absurd?): female, house-wife, mother, good chef, obedient, family, caring to the kids, female. We’re probably quite familiar to these thoughts, and, to a large degree, the comparative end is similarly insidious – where the mass media portrays masculinity as a trope: an essentialist template of physical prowess, decisiveness bordering on blind obstinacy and infinite passion.

THOUGH, logically-speaking, this makes no sense at all. The basic rational and cognitive function of human minds grounds itself in making meaning from practical observations and trends. It is alarming, therefore, that the connotative capacity of this advertisement alone – no much different from any other of its kind – is sufficiently great to trigger the various aforementioned gender associations. This phenomenon is further compounded by its ubiquity. That parallel occurrences have became just so commonplace is already worrying to begin with, yet more so that people are reaching a stage of desensitisation to such prevalent perpetuations of gender stereotypes. The inclination now is not to challenge the impositions of social institutions, but normalise these artifices as the universal constant to disturbing consistency, upon which the greatest of premiums crown.

Marxism and feminism find convergence on the same common contention of human agency: do individual choices exist, and if so, how autonomous can they possibly be?

In The Critique of the Political Economy, German philosopher Karl Marx (1859)  posits the following:

…The mode of production of material life conditions the general processes of social, political… It is not the consciousness of man that create their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness… (The Critique of the Political Economy, p. i-iii)

Here, the construction of identity – and therefore, by extension, our decisions – arguably predicates an uncontrollable “superstructure” of economic organization: the manner and metric by which material goods and services are distributed in society. Undoubtedly, any immediate connection between a Marxist outlook of the economy and feminism is likely tenuous and obscure. This is where I try my best to explain.

MY argument is that in the post-modern, laissez-faire free market, consumerism contributes significantly to entrenching the male-female gender binary. It does not carry the burden of having to be critical to neither Marxist thought, nor capitalism. The hypothesis begins from the (hopefully reasonable) assumption that advertisements, being the most direct and widely applied marketing tool of enterprises, strive to increase demand of a particular product. And in order to do so, advertisements compete to either build commonalities and shared interests with a target audience (say, having a line of perfume scents branded as ideal for the corporate environment), or creating generic themes which resonant strongly within the majority aggregate of consumers. It is hence unsettling that, in this process of commercial outreach, the line of best fit tends to be the line of segregation as well.

This is because advertisements, in attempting to pander to populist social conventions, lean towards portraying goods as complementary to specific genders, and unfortunately to the extent whereby femininity (or masculinity, for that matter) becomes defined by the very products it supports, and society willingly endorses such practices. Paradoxically and disturbingly, females do too, albeit, in most circumstances, not of their own consent. Why?

To answer this question prompts an understanding of “ideology” as a concept that is central to Marxist literary criticism. Louis Althusser (1970) describes ideology as “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” which shields authenticity behind a veneer of what is “socially-acceptable” or “correct”. In its original inception, ideology purposed to frame capitalism as an hidden evil – the silent enemy, and justify some communist epiphany of sorts. Placed against a modern context, however, it normalizes gender roles as what is supposedly a natural state of social tension between the sexes. Historical influences of ultra-conservative systems of patriarchy (which could be as subtle as male-only hunting parties, and more recently and perhaps controversially, the authority and power structures within a family unit) feeding into this existing narrative only clouds it with even more additional biases against women. This means that even female communities face overwhelming difficulties in escaping this system of belief, by sheer virtue of the fact that it has become the dominant social order.

CONSUMERISM in a capitalist economy places immense importance on the ability of a commercial venture to mass market goods and services in pursuit of economic success. At its genesis advertisements bring some congruency to product and gender. In this early stage, the two elements (recall: think a frying pan and a female user) complement each other to present a cohesive and cogent impression that potential buyers feel comfortable viewing and processing, but ultimately remain distinct – the emphasis continues to remain on the product. That’s no longer the case, because consumerism and marketing have reached a threshold whereby gender is almost entirely assimilated into the product; that the artificial edifice of what it means to be “female” is constructed by commercial expedition. As such, female identity has been built and objectified (or, in the preferred terminology of Marx, “reified”) by the associations of branding a product to correspond to social conventions.

THEN, what is the message being proliferated? In Food and Love, writer Katherine Parkin (2006) highlights an advertising culture which embraces a feminine ideology of “sustained involvement in housework”, “marriage, motherhood”, and “deference to male desires”. The incessant perpetuation of such gender stereotypes through advertisements and mass marketing establishes an equilibrium of power that is quite ironically imbalanced against females. Them being placed on the back foot results not in structural discrimination, but a delicate and stealthy infiltration of how we perceive the social environment surrounding ourselves – definitely in some contributing manner producing the glass ceiling in workplace situations, or influencing as foundational and cardinal aspects as behavioral tendencies. The function of ideology explicated in Marxist theory preserves this equilibrium, and any resistance is labeled disruptive and rebellious to what is self-righteously “normal”.

Sources

Althusser, L. (1970). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses. France: Retrieved from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm

Marx, K. (1859). A contribution to the critique of political economy. (p. i-ii). Moscow: Progress Publishers. Retrieved from http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm

Parkin, K. (2006). Food is love. (p. 66, 129, 139). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Retrieved from http://books.google.com.sg/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0IodJ2vuQjYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=advertisements and gender roles&ots=ce90U_xRyX&sig=nX3ymNPRF8csM7DPGfGCB8su02o